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Any explanation of the depressing rural scene in India
cannot be found solely in the village; it must be sought also
in the wider economic and political environment. A study which
starts at village level has the value of describing some of
its essential features and of proposing hypotheses about
changes which might occur within the village in response to
alternative external conditions. The next step is to examine
these hypotheses in the context of the broader environment
in Pachera village in Purnea District. The present discussion
summarises the impact of recent policies and legislation, and
examines (pessimistically) the prospect for revolution in
Northeast India and the probable cost to the peasant of such
an outcome.
1. Recent Policies and Legislation
Tenancy legislation, Community Development, Intensive
Agricultural Area Programmes (IAAP) and projects linked with
IAAP (irrigation and the Small Farmers Development Agency in
particular) have all contributed to the formation of contem-
porary economic and political organization in the village.
The most significant piece of tenancy legislation has
been the abolition of Zamindari in 1951; under this legis-
lation, those who collected rents from tenants and paid a
proportion of it in revenue to the Government (1/10th in
the 1940's) surrendered this right, which had been granted
to them under the terms of the Permanent Settlement in 1873.
All this land was vested in the state, and the rai yat
(tenant-cultivator) paid revenue direct to the Government.
The Survey and Settlement Operations from 1953-58 ensured
that a raiyat's holding was recorded, and could henceforth
be sold, mortgaged or inherited by that raiyat's descend-
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ants. Ex-Zamindars were allowed to retain rights to land which
they were personally cultivating, although ceilings on the amount
of land that could be registered under one person's name were
formally imposed in 1962. Purnea itself acquired notoriety on
account of the 60,000 title suits arising from the Survey and
Settlement Operations, of which 25,000 had been disposed of by
1971
In Pachera village, the ex-Zamindar, Sashi Mohan Jha, person-
ally cultivated 350 acres, and a further 150 acres of his was
sharecropped by the inhabitants of the village. At the time of the
survey the richer peasants in the village persuaded the ex-Zamin-
dar to sell this land to them after hindering his cultivation. By
1971 only 25 acres were still in his possession, and this was
leased out to sharecroppers. Another smaller type of Zamindar,
Jahrul Hassan, had rights over 250. acres in the area (including a
part of Pacher), which were managed by a Khangar (scheduled
caste) patwari who is now one of the two richest farmers in the
dominant peasant group in the village as well as its informal
'Iukhiya (headman). Sashi Mohan Jha's Zamindari was managed by the
Muslim descendants of Jity Patwari who worked for Sashi Mohan
Jha's grandfather and who had established the Muslim community in
Pachera. At the time this land was released on to the market, the
leading members of this Muslim lineage together with the better-
off of the Khangar peasants purchased land of good quality in
greater amounts than anyone else in the village, thereby maintain-
ing or even enhancing their economic and political strength in the
village.
Subsequent legislation of significance to Pachera was the
Bihar Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act of 1955. This was designed to
provide greater protection for sharecroppers by restricting kind
payments to 7/2Oths of the produce of the land, excluding any
share in straw, jute sticks, etc. The system of realising a fixed
rent in kind was prohibited. Provision was made to restore posses-
sion to those sharecroppers who had been ejected by their land-
lords illegally after January 1953. The Bihar Land Reforms (Fixa-
tion of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1962,
included provision for registering sharecroppers as raiyats, but
this has not been implemented because of law and order risks
arising from the landlords' probable reaction.
The most obvious effect of these pieces of legislation has
been to reduce the extent of sharecropping through land purchases
and to stop the outflow of exorbitant payments in rent to an out-
sider who did not reinvest any part of them in the village, thus
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a greater control by cultivators over the distribution of their
produce. It is fair to assume that the amount of marketed sur-
plus was affected by Zamindari abolition, and that the culti-
vator and his family began to consume some of the output previ-
ously appropriated in rent. Payment in kind has not increased
and cash wages have only in the last 2 years increased (in some
cases by 12Z); after other normal expenditures (debt repayments,
marriages etc.) any remaining surplus was at first deployed in
the acquisition of land. As a result, the Khangars and Muslims
have become the dominant landholdíng groups in the village,
followed by the Bais Banias. These groups however, are far
from homogeneous. Two ¡<hangar and two Muslim families are
dominant, and three of those families had previously been con-
nected with the management of the Zamindaris. The two joint
¡<hangar families own 80 and 60 acres, respectively, and each
now owns a tractor. A further ten ¡<hangar households own
between 10 and 20 acres, and a large group own between 5 and
10 acres. At the lower end of the scale, there are some very
poor ¡<hangar families with small, infra-subsistence holdings,
supplemented by share cropping arrangements and some wage
labour. This pattern is repeated in the Muslim and Bais Bania
castes, although a smaller proportion of their households are
in the 10-20 acre category. The ¡<hangars consist of 55 house-
holds, the Muslims of 52, and the Bais Bania of 24. These
figures need to be set against the 81 households of the Mushar
caste - which consists mainly of landless labourers. This
group is relatively new to the village. Members of some
households who immigrated here during the period of expanding
land acquisition by the peasants, recall that employment
opportunities were greater than in their previous home further
to the West of the District. The older Mushar families used to
work for the Zamindar and for the Zamindar's sharecroppers.
The Community Development Programme began to function in
1952, aided by a plethora of egalitarian propaganda on the
radios and in the newspapers Its essential shortcoming appears
to have lain in the attempt to democratise the village without
altering property relationships. The introduction of village
councils, based on the Gandhian notion of independent village
republics ignored the effects of petty tyrannies of the past,
which thus were institutionalised and found convenient protec-
tion for the future in rational ideology and bureaucracy.
Pachera village lies in the Panchayat of Kamalpur, which
includes 7 other villages and has a total population of 11,967
in 1971, whereas Pachera is 1,612. The elected Mukhiya (headman)
of the Panchayat is Jahrul Hassan from Rampur village, who has
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had a small Zamindari in Pachera and elsewhere in the
Panchayat. He was the first 4ukhi,'a, elected in 1955; on that
occasion his opponent received only a handful of votes, and, he
has been unopposed ever since. The Sarpanch (judge) used to be
his patwari from Pachera - the rich Xhangar and informal
Mukhiya - until his age compelled him to nominate a successor.
During this time, not one dispute requiring judgement has
been forwarded from Pachera to the Panchayat. Disputes in
Pachera are either settled by the leaders of each caste hamlet
(tola), or if judgements here are not accepted, or another tola
is involved, or wider implications for the village are perceived
- then the leading Xhangar and Muslim families obtain the
relevant facts and make a judgement. The ex-Sarpanch and infor-
mal Mukhiya pronounces judgement and sentences (usually a fine).
Those sitting in judgement are the richest landholders, control-
ling the majority of the labour force directly or, in the case
of middle and poor peasants, indirectly through their money-
lending and trade activities such as shops. Parties to the
dispute invariably request these leaders to sit in judgement,
thus reinforcing their power in the village. Judgement by anyone
else could not enjoy any legitimacy in the community, and would
be unenforceable. Some cases have been taken to the courts, but
most of those were eventually withdrawn and settled by negotia-
tion within the village.
One of the aims of Community Development is that changes
should occur democratically through a process in which all the
villagers participate and express their needs. The Mukhiya and
his council would have resources at their disposal to meet some
of those 'felt needs'. The only evidence of Panchayat initiative
since 1955 is provided by two hand tube-wells, sunk in Pachera.
The only activity which frequently demands the Mukl-iiya's inter-
vention is the organisation of relief. The distribution of grain
is carried out by him on behalf of the Block Development Office
(B.D.O.), and requires, in principle, little discretion. But by
distributing to the disabled rather than the starving the
Muithipa succeeded in undermining the incipient leadership of a
Yczdav* dissident, who persists in encouraging landless labourers
to seek higher wages and to get land registered in their names.
The denial of grain hand-outs to his followers took away his
credibility overnight. The other case involving relief in
Pachera also concerned the 4ukhiya. A contractor from Kamalpur
village persuaded the Mukhiycz to support a scheme of manual
work for the labourers, which would be met out of the relief
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funds at the Block Office. The labourers should have received
Rs. 21 per 1,000 Cu. ft. of earth shifted; instead they
received Rs. 13, and the contractor (and who else?) received
the difference.
The second theme in Community Development is the assump-
tion that India's peasants will want economic progress and
sustain it through their own efforts once its advantages have
been shown to them. This requires an extension service by which
fresh resources and new ideas are brought to the village through
the bureaucracy, their efficacy is explained and demonstrated,
and the peasant thereafter left to adopt them. Neither the
village social structure nor the wider political and economic
environment within which villagers have to make decisions are
regarded as influencing these processes either negatively or
positively, or as being in need of change.
This doctrine has persisted through the introduction
of the IAAP, which now covers the Western part of Purnea
District, and included Pachera village. In Purnea this
programme operates in conjunction with the introduction of
canal irrigation in the mid6O's. The advent of new technology
and more crop varieties represents a marginal rather than
complete change of behaviour, and applies in varying degrees
to different cultivators. The main change in Pachera has been
through the introduction of exotic varieties of wheat - high
yielding and improved - which require the controlled water
supply provided by irrigation. The gross cropped area in
Pachera went up from 595.4 acres in 1961 to 1,200 in 1971, of
which 1051.66 acres were irrigable. Irrigation was first
available in some parts of the area in 1965. In the 1966-67
season, there were 65 acres under Lerma Rojo*; in 1967-68, 120
acres were under high yielding varieties; rising to 143 acres
in 1968-69. By 1971-72, this area had increased to 200 acres,
with S308 (a variety of wheat) representing 60 per cent of
the crop. High yielding varieties of paddy have rarely ex-
ceeded 3 per cent of the total cropped paddy area.
The principal method by which innovations are induced
in the village is through the village worker (VLW), whose
functions have now been restricted to agricultural extension.
In Pachera, he lives with the informal Mukhiya and tends to
work only with the richer Khangar and Muslim families. His
behaviour is as much determined by the political structure ôf
the village as is that of any other inhabitant. Smaller
*
A high-yielding, Mexican variety of wheat.
37
peasants and sharecroppers rarely see him, let alone talk to
him. The VLW is also responsible for the other villages in
the Panchayat, and he spends a great deal of his time filling
in crop records and collecting statistics for the Block Office.
He is responsible for obtaining block credit for goods and
fertilisers, but tends to do this only for the richer peasants.
The other institutional source of credit is the multi-purpose
Cooperative Society, whose secretary is the head of the other
rich Khangar household, who tends to inform only his close friends
of the arrival of seeds and fertiliser. Others have to find out
for themselves, and many of the small farmers (2.5-5 acres) are
unaware that they are entitled to more favourable credit
facilities, or indeed that they have been taken into the Small
Farmers Development Scheme at all. The principal source of
private credit in the village is the rich Khangar who is the
VLW's hosts
Thus we see how the successful introduction of the new
technology depends upon existing political and economic relation-
ships between rich and poor in the village, and how access to
the opportunities provided by the new technology is therefore
restricted. At the same time wheat growing has certainly
increased steadily in the village as a whole, but only the
richest households boast an output which exceeds their consump-
tion requirements. And even this surplus is insignificant and
irregular. The major source of cash is the growing of jute
which, apart from the adoption of some spraying, has been
largely unaffected by these developments. But again, with the
exception of the richest families, cash derived in this way is
spent on the normal consumption requirements of the household -
meat, vegetables, oil, kerosene, debt repayment (when not in
kind), clothes, marriages, etc. Surplus from jute in excess of
these requirements, together with a surplus from paddy and
wheat, is only enjoyed regularly by the 4 or 5 richest families.
In this way they have been able to acquire extra land at a
faster rate; 2 have been able to buy tractors; pucca houses
are built, shops and a mill acquired, trading activities financed,
money loaned and children are sent away to schools and colleges.
As land becomes scarcer, sharecropping becomes a precarious,
short-term arrangement, increasingly subject to sudden termina-
tion. Labour is plentiful, and its price is therefore kept to
a minimum subsistence level. The small peasant survives, partly
because this price for labour cannot go below subsistence
level, but he cannot accumulate. With the scarcity of land, the
middle and richer peasants can only turn to a more intensive
cultivation of their plots and, where they obtain surpluses,
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either invest in their cultivation or diversify into other
activities. This process reinforces the political structure
which in turn sustains it.
Apart from the increasing inequalities which thus arise
in the village, the implications of this process are more
widespread. If the existing policies continue to be applied,
and in the way described, the essential problem of extracting
a surplus for general economic growth both in the towns and
the countryside will remain, This was one of the consequences
of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP) in Soviet Russia, with a
strong inclination by the richer peasants to sell their
produce locally and engage in commercial activities often in
the local town. As traditional ties dissolve into wage labour,
the landless labourers lose their previous economic security
and physical protection, and increasingly ressemble a rural
proletariat. As these advantages of being a traditional rural
worker disappear, the exodus to urban slums hastens. The
catchment area of Calcutta includes Purnea. The following
section examines whether this process of proletarianization
could generate any process ressembling radical upheaval in
the countryside.
2. The Prospect for Revolution
The most obvious source of potential insurrection in
Purnea and indeed elsewhere in the plains of Bihar, Bengal
and Uttar Pradesh is the large emerging rural proletariat of
landless labourers. It has become increasingly disengaged
from those traditional structural relationships which
allocated some status and security in the village social
structure, and at the same time increasingly dependent on
daily wage labour, which is a highly insecure source of
income in the present situation of labour abundance. The
revolutions of Russia and China were conducted largely with-
out the involvement of a rural proletariat, The evidence
from Purnea is a little ambiguous. In Pachera village the
main group of landless labourers are Mushars - living in 3
separate tolas. One tola is the 'territory' of the Khangars,
another the 'territory' of the Muslim peasants, and the third
divided up among Xhangars., Muslims and other peasant castes.
They complain bitterly that they are given no opportunity,
and that they are robbed (cf. the case of the relief earth-
works). An attempt to seek higher wages fizzled out with no
unity among the three tolas, although the richest families
conceded a 12 pr cent cash increase (with kind payments
unchanged) apparently to secure and maintain the loyalty of
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their respective 'terriftory'. At the same time Mushar
leaders understandably seek every opportunity for personal
gain. Interest on loans within the caste are as exorbitant
as those granted by other castes; they will take work on
contract and hire fellow caste men at basic rates and work
them hard; and in the case of the earth-works, for example,
the Musha.r leaders were bribed and paraded before the block
officials when the wage rate was challenged. Although a
Socialist ladav works among them, he despairs at the
response - they are not agressive about seeking employment
or land. This might be expected, but their behaviour contrasts
dramatically with those of the Santhals (a scheduled tribe
group in the village, originally from South Bihar). The kinship
and political links of the Santhals are more widespread geo-
graphically, information and success stories pass quickly. They
constantly hustle for land and employment - going outside the
village which the 4ushars would never do. They try to sharecrop,
and rear buffaloes for dairy purposes, but also for ploughing
on their own or another's land. A recent incident in Rupeshpur
in Dhamdaha block to the Southwest of Pachera ended in the death
of 14 Santhals - burnt and shot by the dominant peasant group.
This was the result of a long dispute over rights to land and
sharecropping. Within 2 days, a meeting of 7,000 Scznthals had
gathered demanding vengeance.
One cannot simply attribute the difference between the
4uohars' behaviour and that of the Santhals to a variation in
the kinship and social structure of their respective communities.
The SanthaiG were brought to the western part of Purnea at the
turn of the century to clear the jungle by the Bhw'n-har Brahmin
and Raf put landowners who had migrated there because of the low
land rents at that time. The Sarzthals have long resented these
large landowners who have acquired wealth by exploiting them.
The sense of polarisation in this area is very strong, which
explains why the JVaxalites from Calcutta and Delhi chose to
work there. Before they Were rounded up in the middle of 1971,
it appears that they made little impact with any of the other
landless labourer groups or small peasants. Those peasants I
spoke to were very hostile to the ZVaxalitss, although respect-
ful rather than cynical about the self-sacrifice of the St.
Stephen's College boys.
It appears from the foregoing comparison between the
1ushars and Santhals that the history of polarisation in
Dhamdaha was the significant variable. I know of another village
20 miles south of Pachera where more than 50 per cent of the
households are landless labourers, and where there exist some
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very rich farmers, two of them owning 350 acres and 400 acres,
respectively. Here there has been a recent involved history of
labour strikes and land disputes, with battles in the fields.
The leaders have been scheduled caste Hindus - Tatmaa and
Yadavs. There are more conflicts to come, but the large farmers
have been sufficiently threatened and scared to recruit local
officials and magistrates to their cause, and even to persuade
a local leader of the Communist Party to tell the militants
to reduce their activities. If polarisation is a significant
variable in landless labour militancy then implementation of
existing ceiling legislation and small farmers schemes to
preserve the smaller holdings will function to disperse the
hatred of the absolute have-nots. The high number of small
and middle peasants in Pachera and the absence of militancy
among the numerically dominant 4ushars might be thus explained.
If this is so, then the expectation of a natural alliance
between urban proletariat and poor peasants and landless
labourers as a result of close division in the village must
be queried. Certainly peasants only participated actively in
the Bolshevik revolution in the first phase of the seizure of
power, and subsequently after the brief period of NEP - the
leadership turned on the peasants, driving those who had
brought them to power into collectives in order to make them
the main basis and victims of primitive socialist accumulation.
This experience may make us feel that urban leaders have
little to offer the small peasant, but they also have little
opportunity of prising the landless labourer apart from his
community as long as prevailing policies continue to diffuse
class antagonisms and exploit existing rural political
structures in doing so, with close economic and social
dependence of the poor on the rich.
On the other hand without urban leadership it is doubt-
ful whether anything could happen. The Chinese communist
leaders made little headway until the late 20's, and indeed
were severely compromised and almost destroyed by the
Kuomintang as long as they stuck rigidly to the Marxist
doctrine of the importance of the urban, industrial
proletariat as the vanguard of revolution. It was only when
they joined with the peasant against the bourgeois and then
occured the feudal reaction of the Kuomintang that some
exchange between peasant and urban proletariat could occur
with advantages to both. Neither component could have
succeeded independently, yet the success of a peasant
revolution ultimately depended upon the organisational
ability of the urban revolutionaries, despite their
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awareness that there would have to be subsequent expulsions
of the richer peasants and petty landlords as the revolution
advanced towards socialism.
Naxczlites activity is the example of this approach in
West Bengal and Bihar, but to be successful in the country-
side demands a higher level of organisation and discipline
in the cities than at present prevails. Meanwhile if the
current policy of aid to the middle and smaller peasants
(2.5-5 acre holdings) through IAAP, small farmers schemes
and imposition of land ceilings continues and succeeds,
then the prospect indeed looks gloomy for those small
peasants in areas not yet involved in privileged extension
relationships; as it does for sharecroppers who are excluded
from the benefits of these schemes, and the landless agri-
cultural labourers - not to mention the urban proletariat.
Meanwhile the alliance of rich and middle peasants with the
urban bourgeoise, the administration, the military, the
police and the large industrial capitalist families - the
alliance, that is, which pays tributes to the peasant
populist parties - appears strong enough to ensure their
security for some time to come.
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